What Gen Z Thinks About U.S. Foreign Policy

In less than ten years, some members of Gen Z—born roughly between 1997 and 2012—will be eligible to serve as president of the United States. Gen Z’s oldest members are already eligible to serve in the U.S. Congress. The youngest members of Gen Z will turn eighty years old in 2092—not too old to serve as president. This generation’s impact on policy will only grow, particularly as its members take over businesses, government positions, and other positions steering America’s place in the world. The mid twenty-first century will be their moment, and their beliefs and values will deeply shape U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

Gen Z came to political consciousness amid the tumult of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the later years of America’s global war on terror, the pressures of great power competition with Russia and China, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war have marked their formative years. It is unsurprising then that Gen Z voices have already begun to impact America’s political discourse. These young people have protested on college campuses and cast their votes in three presidential elections in growing numbers. But what exactly do members of Gen Z agree on? How do they see the world around them, and America’s place in it? Gen Z is demographically and ideologically diverse, but unifying trends in its members’ beliefs reveal broader inclinations in the American public. With that comes insight into the likely trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in an evolving and turbulent global order. 

To answer these questions, researchers from the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conducted a poll of Gen Z adults in early 2025.¹ Our questions focused on fiercely debated foreign policy issues, from the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine to international actions to combat climate change. The responses revealed a broadly internationalist group, but one that prefers that the United States take a more modest role in the world compared with earlier generations. Like the rest of the country in 2025, Gen Z was polarized by party affiliation on several key policy issues. As might be expected, however, the polarization was much less on a few issues, such as climate change, which stands to have an outsized effect on their lives compared with older generations. We also polled them to ascertain their policy views on Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan and found significant differences along party lines and also with the broader U.S. public.

Gen Z Holds Broadly Internationalist Views, but Is Less Exceptionalist About U.S. Leadership

Gen Z strongly believes the United States should take an active part in world affairs (see figure 1). According to our poll, they were in fact 8 percentage points more likely to agree that the United States should “take an active part” rather than “stay out” of world affairs, compared with the general population.

The difference between Gen Z and older cohorts was particularly pronounced among Gen Z Trump voters, who were 13 percentage points more likely than Republicans from the general American population to favor “an active part in world affairs” (see figure 2). This indicates that the future of the Trump and the MAGA movement could shift in a more internationalist direction over time, although it does not indicate, of course, what the character of that internationalism will look like in terms of the mix between diplomacy, military force, and other tools of foreign policy.

A growing number of Americans today feel that the United States is overstretched in its foreign policy: Nearly half said that the United States needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs (see figure 3). Our survey found that Gen Z was less likely to favor reducing U.S. involvement overseas. By the same token, our Gen Z respondents were more likely than the general American public to think the United States has enough resources to take care of its problems at home and still take a leading role overseas. The smallest portion of Gen Z polled, however, thought that the United States had a “responsibility” to take a leading role due to its power and wealth.

Here again, the divergence was particularly pronounced among Republicans (see figure 4). Compared with Republicans overall, Gen Z Trump voters were 15 percentage points more likely to say that the United States has enough resources to take care of problems at home and abroad. Similarly, overall Republicans were 19 percentage points more likely than our Gen Z Trump voters to want the United States to reduce its involvement in world affairs to focus on problems at home.

Even though Gen Z is more internationalist in its outlook than older generations, it sees a more modest role for the United States. Specifically, our poll found Gen Z 8 percentage points less likely than the general public to say that it was “very important” for the United States to be a world leader in economic strength and 6 percentage points less likely to say the same of military strength (see figure 5). Gen Z was also less likely to say it was “very important” for the United States to play a global leadership role on democratic values. Close to half of Gen Z respondents said that it was “very important” for the United States to play a leadership role on democratic values, slightly less—by 6 percentage points—than the general public.

Interestingly, Gen Z Trump voters were significantly less focused on the military dimension of U.S. leadership than their older cohorts (see figure 6). Whereas 82 percent of Republicans from the general population—a very large number—thought it was “very important” for the United States to play a leading military role, 67 percent of Gen Z Trump voters agreed. This was still greater than the average for a generalized population of U.S. citizens and much greater than for Gen Zers who voted for Kamala Harris (the Democratic Party nominee). The gap between Republican cohorts was reversed, however, when it came to climate change, with 35 percent of Gen Z Trump voters saying it was very important for the United States to take a leading role, compared with only 18 percent of Republicans overall.

Polarization by Party Was Clear on Most Issues, Except for Climate Change 

When it came to foreign policy and national security, Gen Z was clearly polarized along party lines, for example when it came to using U.S. troops. Gen Z Trump voters were far more likely than Gen Z Harris voters to support the use of troops to halt immigration from Mexico (see figure 7). In fact, 75 percent of Gen Z Trump voters supported the use of troops in this scenario, compared to only 27 percent of Gen Z Harris voters.

As might be expected from the student protests in 2024, Gen Z was somewhat more supportive than the general U.S. population when it came to using U.S. troops for peacekeeping between Israel and the Palestinians (see figure 8). There was a partisan divide, however. Gen Z Harris voters were more likely than Trump voters to support this use of troops, but less likely to support troops for Israel in the case of an Iranian attack.

Meanwhile, 60 percent of Gen Z voters favored using American soldiers to support a NATO ally, such as Germany if attacked by Russia, with similar levels of support from both political parties. Support was slightly lower when it came to Eastern Flank allies such as the Baltic states, and this was due to lower levels of support from Gen Z Trump voters. Support for sending U.S. troops to protect South Korea and Taiwan was significantly lower than for NATO allies, with Gen Z Harris voters somewhat more supportive than Trump voters in both cases.

An important exception to this partisan lens appeared when we polled views on climate change. Gen Z polled somewhat more likely overall (by 8 percentage points) to see climate change as a serious problem and support U.S. action in international efforts to combat it (by 9 percentage points) (see figures 9 and 10). The most striking difference, however, was the concern expressed by younger Trump voters about the issue. Trump Gen Zers were significantly more likely than older Republicans to consider climate change a serious problem and support American participation in international efforts to combat it (see figures 11 and 12). Gen Z Trump voters were also more likely than Republicans from the general public to say that climate change was a “serious problem.” In fact, Gen Z Trump voters were 20 percentage points more likely than Republicans from the general public to see climate change as either an “extremely” or “very” serious problem. By comparison, older generations of Republican voters were more likely to say that climate change is “not too serious” or “not” a problem. This concern among Republican Gen Zers extended to U.S. action against climate change on the world stage, with Gen Z Trump voters far more likely to support U.S. participation in such efforts than their older counterparts.

Views on Key Countries: China, Israel, Ukraine

We also polled Gen Z opinions on three key countries for the United States: China, Israel, and Ukraine.

China

On China, Gen Z was 16 percentage points less likely to say it was “very important” for the United States to avoid a military conflict than the general public (see figure 13). This might be because they think a military confrontation with China is unlikely, or because they are not all that worried about the fallout from a confrontation. Gen Z was also less concerned about American supremacy over China than the general population, and significantly less likely to say that it was “very important” for the United States to maintain its technological edge over China in high-tech industries. This tracks with our finding that 11 percentage points fewer Gen Zers thought it was “very important” for the United States to be a world leader in scientific and technological progress, compared with the general U.S. population. 

Gen Z was also somewhat less likely than the general American public to say that promoting human rights in China was a “very important” goal. The divergence was particularly stark among young Democrats, who were 15 percentage points less likely to say that it was “very important” to promote human rights and democracy in China compared to Democrats from the general population (see figure 14). This finding links to the question of American leadership abroad, where Gen Z was slightly less supportive of the United States leading on democracy abroad (see figure 5).

Israel

Israel was a hot topic in the year prior to the poll on account of the Israel-Hamas war and the broader controversy that the war provoked on college campuses in the United States. In our poll, 44 percent of Gen Zers were against U.S. military support to Israel, and 24 percent favored only defensive weapons (as opposed to defensive and offensive weapons) for Israel. Within our sample, more than half of Gen Z Harris voters said the United States should not be supporting Israel militarily, while Gen Z Trump voters were the most supportive of Israel, with a plurality (40 percent) saying that the United States should provide Israel with both defensive and offensive weapons (see figure 15). 

While there was speculation that young Gen Z voters might abstain from voting or vote for a third-party candidate to boycott the mainstream parties’ support for Israel in the 2024 elections, our polling did not indicate that this group was less supportive of Israel. In fact, Gen Z voters who did not vote or who voted for a third-party candidate were less likely than Gen Z Harris voters to say that the United States should not be supporting Israel militarily.

We also asked respondents whether they felt more personally connected to Israelis, Palestinians, both, or neither. Again, partisan divisions emerged: A plurality of Gen Z Harris voters said they felt most connected to the Palestinians (38 percent) while Gen Z Trump voters felt more connected to Israelis (32 percent). Nevertheless, while Gen Z Trump voters were more likely to feel connected to Israelis, they did so in much lower numbers than the broader Republican population (see figure 16). Further, the plurality of Gen Z Trump voters felt connected to neither Israelis nor Palestinians (34 percent) while the majority of Republican voters from the general population felt more connected to Israelis (52 percent). For their part, Gen Z Harris voters felt more connected to the plight of Palestinians than their older Democrat counterparts (see figure 17). A plurality of Gen Z Harris voters said they felt most connected to the Palestinians (38 percent), while a plurality of Democrats from the general population said they felt connected to both Israelis and Palestinians (33 percent). Overall, Gen Z was more likely to feel connected to Palestinians than Israelis, but the plurality was more likely than the general population not to feel connected to either (see figure 18).

Ukraine

On Ukraine, Gen Z viewed support for Ukraine similarly to the general population, although the general population was slightly more likely to say that the United States is giving too much support to Ukraine (by 6 percentage points) and Gen Z was more likely to say it is giving the right amount of support (by 5 percentage points) (see figure 19).

However, partisanship was still a better predictor of how Americans, both Gen Z and from the total population, viewed support to Ukraine. Gen Z Trump voters were more favorable to U.S. support than Republicans overall (see figure 20). Gen Z Harris supporters were more likely to say that the United States was giving about the right amount of support to Ukraine compared to Democrats overall, who were more likely to say the United States was not giving enough support to Ukraine (see figure 21). Both within Gen Z and in the general population, Republicans were more likely to say the United States was giving too much support to Ukraine and Democrats were more likely to say the United States was not giving enough support. However, Gen Z Trump voters were more supportive of Ukraine than Republicans from the general population, and the opposite was true for Gen Z Harris voters and Democrats. 

Political Tendencies and the Salience of Foreign Policy

When it came to voting in the 2024 presidential election, the plurality of Gen Z in our sample voted for Kamala Harris, at a rate of about 5 percentage points higher than the national rate (see figure 22). They also defied expectations of low voter turnout for young voters—71 percent voted in the 2024 election, higher than the national average of 64 percent. More Gen Z members in our sample voted for Harris than did not vote or voted for a third-party candidate. Among Gen Z voters, there were clear gender gaps in voting patterns (see figure 23). Gen Z women were 10 percent more likely to vote for Harris than Trump. Notably, Gen Z men were also more likely to vote for Harris than men from the general population were (by 5 percentage points). Gen Z women were the most supportive of Harris: 58 percent of Gen Z women in our sample voted for Harris.

According to our poll, foreign policy issues were less important for Gen Z than domestic issues in the 2024 presidential election (see figure 24). There were two exceptions: climate change for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Among Gen Z Harris voters, 66 percent said climate change was “very important” in determining which candidate to support, while 61 percent of Gen Z Trump voters said the same of immigration. Overall, when asked whether foreign policy was important in determining whom they voted for or if they voted in the first place, the plurality of Gen Z said that foreign policy was “somewhat important” in their decision (see figure 25).

Where Does Gen Z Get Its Information on Foreign Policy?

As part of our poll, we also asked questions about how Gen Z gets access to news about foreign policy issues. This is the first generation of “digital natives” who grew up with the internet integrated into their everyday lives. In other polls, Gen Zers have reported using various social media platforms “almost constantly,” including for news. Social media sites like TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram have become their newsstands. Gen Z has used social media to learn about and spread information on causes they believe in, from protesting the murder of George Floyd in 2020 in the United States to calling for the overthrow of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh to demanding a ceasefire in Gaza worldwide. Borders blur as social media users across the world speak out for change. 

It follows, therefore, that Gen Z also gets the bulk of its news on foreign policy and national security from social media (see figure 26). Social networks in general were the top sources of information for Gen Z on foreign policy, with the majority (indicating in a multiselect item) that they got their news from social media (74 percent) followed by talking to friends (43 percent). There was limited use of print journalism among Gen Z (only 7 percent), although 41 percent reported the use of online journalism.

Faith in traditional newspapers (such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal) was also limited—only 22 percent responded that traditional newspapers were “very trustworthy,” while 16 percent said the same of social media (see figure 27).

Survey Design and Methodology

The data analyzed here are from an original online survey of a nationally representative sample of 800 Gen Z adults who are 18–27 years old. The survey was designed by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and conducted by polling firm YouGov between January 31 and February 11, 2025. Overall results have a margin of error of plus or minus 4.1 percent, with higher margins of error for individual demographic subcategories. (When subsetting the data to only Gen Z Harris voters, the margin of error would be plus or minus 6.54 percent. When subsetting the data to only Gen Z Trump voters, the margin of error is plus or minus 8.27 percent.)

To design our survey questions and provide comparisons to the general public, we used data from other surveys (see box 1). The sourcing is indicated in the charts and includes polling from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Pew Research Center. These polls were conducted in different time frames and have their own sample sizes and margins of error.