Carnegie India
The consensus on economic globalisation and a relative harmony among the major powers—which defined the post Cold War era—is now breaking down.
New Delhi should aim to become a leader in financial intelligence. But there are several things the central government needs to do before it can solidify that leadership.
New Delhi and Seoul should focus on building flexible middle power coalitions in Asia to limit the impact of the current volatility in the relations between the United States and China.
There are many lessons to be drawn from the darker days of India’s political history. The one that ought to be demystified is the view that the suspension or promotion of democracy necessarily stuns or shocks international leaders to the extent that those in India might expect them to.
The promise and peril of the Helsinki summit comes from the fact that the U.S. president is ready to discard the conventional wisdom—not just on Russia, but on America’s role in Eurasia and its relations with its allies.
India has a vast talent pool and a burgeoning start-up scene which, if properly tapped and encouraged, could not only provide indigenous military solutions, but could also create significant domestic expertise, which could then be exported.
India cannot and will not compete with China in the AI realm—instead it will play to its advantages by becoming a global AI hub for non-Chinese and non-Western markets.
While New Delhi has begun to build on the synergies with the United Arab Emirates on counter-terrorism and long-term strategic economic cooperation, it has barely scratched the surface of what is possible in the domain of defense.
Leading the Financial Action Task Force will help further the narrative of India as an emerging power, a vision Prime Minister Modi and his team have charted.
China’s and India’s respective military postures, and the perceptions these developments engender on both sides, indicate a path forward. These nuclear rivals should take steps to stabilize their relationship and reduce the chances of conflict.
India’s continuing political challenges with China’s Belt and Road Initiative have been matched by New Delhi’s enduring difficulties in advancing its own connectivity initiatives.
While the hopes for a durable peace might be premature, the conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan might be entering a new phase in their long and depressing history.
In the course of one morning in Singapore, U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have begun to loosen a deeply entrenched and hostile relationship.
Both the European Union and its member states have talked about the importance of multilateralism and a rules-based order in their foreign policy approaches. It is time to implement this in the Indian Ocean.
With New Delhi must looking for stronger ties with both the maritime and continental powers does not mean the nature and scope of these possibilities is symmetric.
Securing the eastern Indian Ocean in partnership with Southeast Asian littorals like Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand could be one of the important near-term Indian contributions to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to Singapore focuses on three increasingly interconnected themes—the strategic, economic, and technological.
If the idea of Asia drew New Delhi and Jakarta close in the 1950s, it might well be the Indo-Pacific that will provide the framework for long overdue strategic re-engagement.
Indian Prime Minister Modi’s informal summits in Wuhan with Chinese President Xi and Sochi with Russian President Putin are part of the new nimble footed Indian diplomacy toward major powers.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal appears to have put regime change at the very center of the new American power play against Tehran.