Whatever might be the civilian rhetoric, Pakistan’s army leadership is quite conscious that making the United States an enemy and putting all the eggs in the China basket is not a smart strategy.
India and the United States hosted the inaugural 2+2 dialogue on September 6, 2018, which underlined the deepening bilateral relationship.
While the outrage against outsourcing the Afghan war is real, the tragic reality is that the growing role of private armies is very much part of the modern hybrid wars.
India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
It is the nature of the negotiation between the United States and Pakistan—the most important external players in the Afghan conflict—that will determine the outcome.
The period known as the “Emergency” in India—June 1975 to March 1977—is widely recognized as one of the darkest episodes in the nation’s 70-year history.
Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “relaxed realism” on external issues stands in marked contrast to the liberals on the left and the nationalists on the right, who framed India’s international policies in extreme terms.
If China returned to genuine neutrality on the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan, it could make it a lot easier for New Delhi to set aside its sovereignty argument on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With an assertive China and uncertainty of U.S. policy under the Trump administration, Europe and India have realized they have much to offer each other.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.