Trade issues are not a formal part of this week’s dialogue in Delhi between the visiting U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and Indian Union Commerce Minister Suresh Prabhu. But there is no doubt that mounting trade tensions between India and the United States have cast a dark shadow over the talks.
For both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the new emphasis on separating religion from politics and confronting “political Islam” is not a question of defining an abstract theory of the state. It is a considered response to the grave challenges they face.
Current U.S. policy approaches toward the Indian subcontinent need to be understood against a far longer historical backdrop of U.S. involvement in South Asia.
The evolution of India’s foreign policy has been shaped by its experience in balancing competing interests during the Cold War.
If the United States effectively uses its considerable residual leverage in Afghanistan, Pakistan does not try and turn Afghanistan into a weak protectorate, and the Taliban does not overreach inside Afghanistan, there is reason for optimism.
New Delhi’s traditional fear of alliances is based on a profound misreading of what they might mean. Alliances are not a “permanent wedlock” or some kind of a “bondage.” They are a political or military arrangement to cope with a common threat.
Unlike his predecessors, who asked India to downsize its presence in Afghanistan in order to placate Pakistan, U.S. President Trump is asking India to do more.
The economic advancement of Bangladesh helps lift up the whole of the eastern Subcontinent, including India’s Northeast as well as Bhutan and Nepal.
Today as a rising China projects its economic and military power into the Indian Ocean, any strategy for regional balance would necessarily involve the economic and military development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Even if the Trump administration cuts some slack to India, the larger problems posed by his approach to global politics will inevitably impinge on ties with India.