Unlike in the traditional Belt and Road projects, India has significant capabilities in the space and digital domains.
India and Taiwan are keen to cultivate closer economic and cultural ties, but doing so will require concrete actions and political commitments.
While New Delhi and Tokyo have identified regional cooperation across the Indo-Pacific as a major objective of their bilateral partnership, cooperation with ASEAN remains at the heart of their Indo-Pacific approach.
The first summit between Trump and Kim enhanced Singapore’s reputation as Asia’s emerging diplomatic centre. For Hanoi, the second summit is a big opportunity to showcase Vietnam’s dramatic economic transformation in recent years.
As New Delhi copes with the new imperatives of governing in the digital age, any sensible policy will have to navigate the tensions between state and the citizen, capital and the consumer, public good and private gain, and between competing interests within the capital—both domestic and foreign.
China’s rising profile in the Andaman Sea is not limited to building strategic infrastructure like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kra Canal that allow Beijing reduce its current dependence on the Malacca Straits and access the Indian Ocean directly. Its military profile too is rising.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
Major waterways in South Asia are at risk of overuse, but India and its neighbors face an uphill battle to broaden multilateral cooperation in response.
India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
New Delhi and Seoul should focus on building flexible middle power coalitions in Asia to limit the impact of the current volatility in the relations between the United States and China.