On October 11, 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold their second informal summit in Mamallapuram in southern India. The conversation may follow from the two leaders’ earlier meeting in April 2018 in the Chinese city of Wuhan.
What is increasingly apparent is that the imposition of reciprocal tariffs on goods is a symptom of a larger structural shift in Sino-U.S. relations.
The post-Tiananmen era in China had an element that reinforced Deng Xiaoping’s model of “open economy and closed polity”—the rise of the all-knowing surveillance state with enormous potential for digital repression.
The unfolding dynamic around Taiwan will have significant consequences for India’s Act East Policy and its emerging role in the Indo–Pacific region.
Beijing and New Delhi’s simultaneous rise has led both countries to take a more assertive approach to issues such as border disputes, resulting in the Doklam crisis. There are, however, opportunities for practical cooperation between China and India.
Unlike in the traditional Belt and Road projects, India has significant capabilities in the space and digital domains.
India and Taiwan are keen to cultivate closer economic and cultural ties, but doing so will require concrete actions and political commitments.
As New Delhi copes with the new imperatives of governing in the digital age, any sensible policy will have to navigate the tensions between state and the citizen, capital and the consumer, public good and private gain, and between competing interests within the capital—both domestic and foreign.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
Major waterways in South Asia are at risk of overuse, but India and its neighbors face an uphill battle to broaden multilateral cooperation in response.