China’s rising profile in the Andaman Sea is not limited to building strategic infrastructure like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kra Canal that allow Beijing reduce its current dependence on the Malacca Straits and access the Indian Ocean directly. Its military profile too is rising.
America’s renewed sanctions on Iran, which kicked in Monday this week, mark the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East.
The India-Japan summit has laid out the foundations for a stronger operational strategic collaboration between the two countries.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
While New Delhi focuses narrowly on its own interests—energy security, welfare of migrant labor, and counter-terror cooperation—it tends to recoil from any political discussion of the existential challenges to the Arab Gulf.
As the Indian Ocean Region becomes enmeshed in the greater Indo-Pacific architecture, how is India adjusting the way it interacts with regional actors?
As storm clouds gather in the Gulf, New Delhi can’t afford to ignore the deepening Arab fears about Iran and their expectations for a measure of political understanding from India.
New Delhi’s messy relationship with Islamabad will continue to draw headlines in the Subcontinent at the expense of India’s other engagements at the UN.
India and Europe have good reasons to strengthen their security partnership—as a hedge against the rise of new regional hegemons and U.S. retrenchment in Eurasia.
India and the Baltic states must establish closer dialogue on strategic issues and deepen their relationship across the political, cultural, and economic levels.