Amidst the new global pushback against Huawei and India’s own plans to introduce 5G mobile technology, New Delhi might have to revisit the old arguments and take a fresh look at its relationship with the Chinese tech giant.
Unlike the European colonial powers, which could easily prevail over natives of the strategic island territories, today’s major powers have to deal with the more complex domestic politics of the island nations.
China’s rising profile in the Andaman Sea is not limited to building strategic infrastructure like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kra Canal that allow Beijing reduce its current dependence on the Malacca Straits and access the Indian Ocean directly. Its military profile too is rising.
America’s renewed sanctions on Iran, which kicked in Monday this week, mark the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East.
The India-Japan summit has laid out the foundations for a stronger operational strategic collaboration between the two countries.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
If a revolutionary Iran exports ideology and destabilizes its neighbors, others have no option but to push back, balance, or contain.
As the Indian Ocean Region becomes enmeshed in the greater Indo-Pacific architecture, how is India adjusting the way it interacts with regional actors?
India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.