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Even if the Trump administration cuts some slack to India, the larger problems posed by his approach to global politics will inevitably impinge on ties with India.
The once tranquil Andaman Sea has begun to acquire a new strategic vitality. After prolonged neglect, India is taking steps to protect its natural primacy in the Andaman Sea on the economic and security fronts.
As a far more sweeping technological revolution envelops the world today, governments are finding new ways to adapt.
Crucial questions need to be asked with regards to fragmented legal frameworks, unclear regulatory practices ambiguous policy advances and voluntary measures governing gene-editing technologies at national and international levels.
Amidst the new global pushback against Huawei and India’s own plans to introduce 5G mobile technology, New Delhi might have to revisit the old arguments and take a fresh look at its relationship with the Chinese tech giant.
New Delhi is paying too little attention to the growing weight of the Gulf in regional affairs and the strategic possibilities that it opens up for India.
This volatile history of India-Pakistan engagement over the last decade makes the agreement on opening the Kartarpur corridor quite significant.
As the United Kingdom seeks to bolster its trade with Australia, China, Japan, and India, the importance of sea lines of communications across the Indian ocean will grow and this will increase the strategic logic for the U.K. to have a naval presence in the region.
Unlike the European colonial powers, which could easily prevail over natives of the strategic island territories, today’s major powers have to deal with the more complex domestic politics of the island nations.
Ending India’s amnesia about the two World Wars must now be followed by a more purposeful engagement with Europe in reordering the security architecture of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.
China’s rising profile in the Andaman Sea is not limited to building strategic infrastructure like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kra Canal that allow Beijing reduce its current dependence on the Malacca Straits and access the Indian Ocean directly. Its military profile too is rising.
America’s renewed sanctions on Iran, which kicked in Monday this week, mark the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East.
The India-Japan summit has laid out the foundations for a stronger operational strategic collaboration between the two countries.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
The outrageous murder of the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul has brought into sharp relief the deepening conflict between Riyadh and Ankara.
While New Delhi focuses narrowly on its own interests—energy security, welfare of migrant labor, and counter-terror cooperation—it tends to recoil from any political discussion of the existential challenges to the Arab Gulf.
Major waterways in South Asia are at risk of overuse, but India and its neighbors face an uphill battle to broaden multilateral cooperation in response.
If a revolutionary Iran exports ideology and destabilizes its neighbors, others have no option but to push back, balance, or contain.
As storm clouds gather in the Gulf, New Delhi can’t afford to ignore the deepening Arab fears about Iran and their expectations for a measure of political understanding from India.
New Delhi’s messy relationship with Islamabad will continue to draw headlines in the Subcontinent at the expense of India’s other engagements at the UN.