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With New Delhi must looking for stronger ties with both the maritime and continental powers does not mean the nature and scope of these possibilities is symmetric.
Securing the eastern Indian Ocean in partnership with Southeast Asian littorals like Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand could be one of the important near-term Indian contributions to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to Singapore focuses on three increasingly interconnected themes—the strategic, economic, and technological.
If the idea of Asia drew New Delhi and Jakarta close in the 1950s, it might well be the Indo-Pacific that will provide the framework for long overdue strategic re-engagement.
Indian Prime Minister Modi’s informal summits in Wuhan with Chinese President Xi and Sochi with Russian President Putin are part of the new nimble footed Indian diplomacy toward major powers.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal appears to have put regime change at the very center of the new American power play against Tehran.
It’s time for India, France, and Australia to join forces. This innovative security triangle is no flight of think tank fancy, but an ambition now being considered at the highest levels of policy.
As Beijing begins to recognize the potential dangers to China from U.S. President Trump’s policies on trade and security, President Xi has turned on the charm offensive towards its Asian neighbors.
The South Asian stalemate is likely to endure even as South and North Korea appear poised to turn the page.
The India-Nordic Summit, which explored areas for practical cooperation and strategic convergence between both sides, represents a fundamentally new approach toward the relationship.
In agreeing to an “informal summit” in the city of Wuhan on the banks of the Yangtze, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping have chosen to take charge of the Sino-Indian relationship.
The India–France partnership could form the model for burden-sharing between India and its Western friends.
While partnerships between big and middle powers will determine the balance of power in the region, islands will shape the new framework for a security architecture.
After decades of ignoring it, New Delhi now believes that a rejuvenated Commonwealth could lend greater depth to India’s global outreach.
An India that is less inhibited about trade liberalization and more open to commercial, technological, and civil society partnerships will find Nordic countries ready to accelerate its internal modernization and international rise.
Far from what is needed to realize its ambitious vision, the Survey proposes a cash transfer with a dubious ability to compensate beneficiaries for the transition costs of moving to a new system, and one that would be financed by an indiscriminate culling of existing welfare schemes.
As a rising power, India recognizes the Commonwealth as a valuable forum for it to redefine itself on the global stage. The Commonwealth has much to gain from India’s engagement as well.
India might be quite open to a substantive dialogue with China on the Belt and Road Initiative if Xi is prepared to address New Delhi’s concerns on sovereignty and sustainability.
Standing up against India has unfortunately become an important part of Nepal’s definition of sovereignty.
As China continues to expand its presence across the maritime domain, the establishment of infrastructure projects, like the Kra Canal, is likely to influence the new emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.