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Today the House of Saud is becoming a valuable partner for New Delhi in promoting regional security in the subcontinent and beyond.
We may not know how the present and future crises might end, but there is no question that Balakot has changed the familiar script of India-Pakistan military crises.
The Pakistan government’s decision to release the captured Indian pilot as a ‘gesture of peace’ opens a window of opportunity to defuse the ongoing crisis.
For the emerging forces of political moderation and social modernization in the Middle East, India is a more attractive partner than Pakistan.
The first summit between Trump and Kim enhanced Singapore’s reputation as Asia’s emerging diplomatic centre. For Hanoi, the second summit is a big opportunity to showcase Vietnam’s dramatic economic transformation in recent years.
The Indian Emergency bears little direct parallels to the situation in the United States as yet. But it underlines why, in democratic systems of government, emergency powers, once unleashed, can and potentially will acquire a life of their own.
Recent revelations about the Rafale deal have all focused on one central question: was the contract for 36 aircrafts secured by the NDA government on better terms than the older UPA negotiations for 126 medium multi-role combat aircrafts, especially with respect to cost and delivery time?
As New Delhi prepares to host the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, India must come to terms with an unfamiliar idea—“nationalism in Arabia”.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to India—as part of a larger tour of Asia, including Pakistan and China—should mark the consolidation of two important trends and help initiate a significant third.
The upcoming visit of Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, to India is not a routine affair. The trip to India is evidently timed to burnish his legitimacy after the international opprobrium that followed the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Trade issues are not a formal part of this week’s dialogue in Delhi between the visiting U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and Indian Union Commerce Minister Suresh Prabhu. But there is no doubt that mounting trade tensions between India and the United States have cast a dark shadow over the talks.
For both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the new emphasis on separating religion from politics and confronting “political Islam” is not a question of defining an abstract theory of the state. It is a considered response to the grave challenges they face.
If the United States effectively uses its considerable residual leverage in Afghanistan, Pakistan does not try and turn Afghanistan into a weak protectorate, and the Taliban does not overreach inside Afghanistan, there is reason for optimism.
As New Delhi copes with the new imperatives of governing in the digital age, any sensible policy will have to navigate the tensions between state and the citizen, capital and the consumer, public good and private gain, and between competing interests within the capital—both domestic and foreign.
While the Center, the opposition, and the state governments jostle to provide fiscal support and farm loan waivers, fundamental reform for land use is being overlooked.
New Delhi’s traditional fear of alliances is based on a profound misreading of what they might mean. Alliances are not a “permanent wedlock” or some kind of a “bondage.” They are a political or military arrangement to cope with a common threat.
Unlike his predecessors, who asked India to downsize its presence in Afghanistan in order to placate Pakistan, U.S. President Trump is asking India to do more.
Instead of reacting with injured innocence, New Delhi should undertake a clear-eyed appraisal of the situation in Afghanistan as well as its own approach.
The economic advancement of Bangladesh helps lift up the whole of the eastern Subcontinent, including India’s Northeast as well as Bhutan and Nepal.
Today as a rising China projects its economic and military power into the Indian Ocean, any strategy for regional balance would necessarily involve the economic and military development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.