The unfolding dynamic around Taiwan will have significant consequences for India’s Act East Policy and its emerging role in the Indo–Pacific region.
No other set of issues will shape India’s future global trajectory more than a pragmatic reorientation of its trade strategy and the reformation of its negotiating structures.
Rather than pray for the success of SAARC, the new government in New Delhi should double down on informal diplomacy that could help pave the way for more purposeful regional cooperation—both bilateral and multilateral.
The rejigging of the political relations between the United States, China, and Russia might present New Delhi with fleeting strategic opportunities that need to be seized quickly.
In recent years, some of the most dramatic situations in Indian public life have arisen in the higher judiciary—an arm of the state ideally characterized by collegiality, scholarship, predictability, and remoteness from raucous politics.
That China and India compete for foreign military bases is not merely an extension of their very familiar rivalry, but a definitive moment in their overall political evolution as modern states.
As technological innovation, commercial competition, and geopolitical rivalry put great strain on the old order in space, New Delhi will need all the strategic pragmatism, legal acumen, and diplomatic skill in shaping new rules for the regulation of outer space.
In a joint statement issued after the consultations, America, Russia, and China outlined agreement on a set of broad parameters for promoting peace in Afghanistan.
Unlike in the traditional Belt and Road projects, India has significant capabilities in the space and digital domains.
India’s transition to private markets is predicated on how well it regulates private activities across a range of economic sectors, such as finance, telecom, and infrastructure.
It has been a rather long learning curve for New Delhi to separate presumed transcendental religious solidarity and the logic of national self-interest in engaging the Middle East.
Contestation is intense in this election, and the incoming Indian government—irrespective of its composition—will be under pressure to perform.
The problem is not the lack of big ideas within Indian political class. There are a host of other reasons that limit public engagement on foreign policy. Few parties believe foreign policy is of any importance in winning elections.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision striking down the RBI’s February 2018 circular on bad loans highlights something significant about the state machinery—the extent to which it can be a source of risk for private businesses.
Before India’s political scene got so intensely polarized, there was a time when the Opposition celebrated the government’s national security achievements. It also offered close scrutiny of government policies on science and technology.
Prospects for a sensible neighborhood policy can’t rest solely on having single-party governments at the center and ‘responsible’ chief ministers in the border states. India needs a measure of political consensus on regional policies.
As countries debate an emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, a key area is missing from the discussion: the role of islands. Much as they did in the past, islands will come to play a critical role in shaping the new order in the Indian Ocean region.
New Delhi’s efforts should be geared toward getting China to yet again calibrate its approach to India and Pakistan.
The national security establishment must extend full support to the Election Commission in fending off many likely threats to the integrity of the elections and help raise the awareness of the political class on the new dangers of the digital age.
The election is a good opportunity for the BJP and the Congress to debate the changing international situation, potential Indian responses, and the much needed reform in India’s defense and national security system.