It’s time for India, France, and Australia to join forces. This innovative security triangle is no flight of think tank fancy, but an ambition now being considered at the highest levels of policy.
As Beijing begins to recognize the potential dangers to China from U.S. President Trump’s policies on trade and security, President Xi has turned on the charm offensive towards its Asian neighbors.
The South Asian stalemate is likely to endure even as South and North Korea appear poised to turn the page.
The India-Nordic Summit, which explored areas for practical cooperation and strategic convergence between both sides, represents a fundamentally new approach toward the relationship.
In agreeing to an “informal summit” in the city of Wuhan on the banks of the Yangtze, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping have chosen to take charge of the Sino-Indian relationship.
The India–France partnership could form the model for burden-sharing between India and its Western friends.
While partnerships between big and middle powers will determine the balance of power in the region, islands will shape the new framework for a security architecture.
After decades of ignoring it, New Delhi now believes that a rejuvenated Commonwealth could lend greater depth to India’s global outreach.
An India that is less inhibited about trade liberalization and more open to commercial, technological, and civil society partnerships will find Nordic countries ready to accelerate its internal modernization and international rise.
Far from what is needed to realize its ambitious vision, the Survey proposes a cash transfer with a dubious ability to compensate beneficiaries for the transition costs of moving to a new system, and one that would be financed by an indiscriminate culling of existing welfare schemes.
India might be quite open to a substantive dialogue with China on the Belt and Road Initiative if Xi is prepared to address New Delhi’s concerns on sovereignty and sustainability.
Standing up against India has unfortunately become an important part of Nepal’s definition of sovereignty.
As China continues to expand its presence across the maritime domain, the establishment of infrastructure projects, like the Kra Canal, is likely to influence the new emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un went to Beijing after demonstrating that he is capable of standing up to the world, has complete control over his system, and can deal with the United States on his own.
India may soon close a deal with Russia to purchase two S-400 air defense systems, thereby triggering secondary sanctions from the United States. Without Congressional action, the U.S.-India defense relationship will likely suffer.
Last year, the Union ministry of commerce constituted a task force to look at how Artificial Intelligence can be leveraged for India’s economic growth.
Successive governments in New Delhi since the end of the Cold War have managed to construct and nurture a measure of foreign policy consensus and nudge India along a pragmatic international trajectory.
While there is much uncertainty about its final form, it is clear that the quest for universal basic income involves navigating the tricky waters of weak state capacity and the urgency of improving India’s existing welfare architecture.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands provide significant surveillance and monitoring advantages to India’s navy. If India can chart out a role for the islands in its maritime domain awareness project, it can achieve far greater deterrence through staging and power projection.
Any reset of the China-India relationship would necessarily include an effort to widen the areas of cooperation that will provide some balance against the many negative factors that are unsettling bilateral relations.