India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “relaxed realism” on external issues stands in marked contrast to the liberals on the left and the nationalists on the right, who framed India’s international policies in extreme terms.
If China returned to genuine neutrality on the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan, it could make it a lot easier for New Delhi to set aside its sovereignty argument on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With an assertive China and uncertainty of U.S. policy under the Trump administration, Europe and India have realized they have much to offer each other.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.
Any easing of tensions with Afghanistan and India will significantly boost Pakistan’s prospects for economic advancement at home and the elevation of its international standing.
Rather than debate India’s future with Pakistan's Prime Minister-designate Imran Khan in terms of “loves me, loves me not,” Delhi should focus on strengthening its position in Afghanistan, which once again is poised to shape Pakistan’s relations with India.
The election of Imran Khan makes little difference to Pakistan's India policy, which is controlled by the army and the so-called state institutions.
Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese-Buddhist community should combat global isolation and the recent rise of extremist groups by using their Buddhist faith to strengthen transnational ties.
While New Delhi struggles to meet the growing demand in Africa for security cooperation, Beijing, a latecomer in this business, is racing ahead.
The consensus on economic globalisation and a relative harmony among the major powers—which defined the post Cold War era—is now breaking down.
New Delhi should aim to become a leader in financial intelligence. But there are several things the central government needs to do before it can solidify that leadership.
New Delhi and Seoul should focus on building flexible middle power coalitions in Asia to limit the impact of the current volatility in the relations between the United States and China.
There are many lessons to be drawn from the darker days of India’s political history. The one that ought to be demystified is the view that the suspension or promotion of democracy necessarily stuns or shocks international leaders to the extent that those in India might expect them to.
The promise and peril of the Helsinki summit comes from the fact that the U.S. president is ready to discard the conventional wisdom—not just on Russia, but on America’s role in Eurasia and its relations with its allies.
India has a vast talent pool and a burgeoning start-up scene which, if properly tapped and encouraged, could not only provide indigenous military solutions, but could also create significant domestic expertise, which could then be exported.
In order to sustain the present momentum in EU-India ties, both sides will have to make an extra effort to convert converging interests into concrete cooperation.
India cannot and will not compete with China in the AI realm—instead it will play to its advantages by becoming a global AI hub for non-Chinese and non-Western markets.
While New Delhi has begun to build on the synergies with the United Arab Emirates on counter-terrorism and long-term strategic economic cooperation, it has barely scratched the surface of what is possible in the domain of defense.
Leading the Financial Action Task Force will help further the narrative of India as an emerging power, a vision Prime Minister Modi and his team have charted.