While New Delhi focuses narrowly on its own interests—energy security, welfare of migrant labor, and counter-terror cooperation—it tends to recoil from any political discussion of the existential challenges to the Arab Gulf.
Major waterways in South Asia are at risk of overuse, but India and its neighbors face an uphill battle to broaden multilateral cooperation in response.
If a revolutionary Iran exports ideology and destabilizes its neighbors, others have no option but to push back, balance, or contain.
As storm clouds gather in the Gulf, New Delhi can’t afford to ignore the deepening Arab fears about Iran and their expectations for a measure of political understanding from India.
New Delhi’s messy relationship with Islamabad will continue to draw headlines in the Subcontinent at the expense of India’s other engagements at the UN.
India and Europe have good reasons to strengthen their security partnership—as a hedge against the rise of new regional hegemons and U.S. retrenchment in Eurasia.
India and the Baltic states must establish closer dialogue on strategic issues and deepen their relationship across the political, cultural, and economic levels.
When all is said and done about Indian Prime Minister Modi’s diplomatic record, his outreach to Europe is likely to emerge as a major contribution to India’s foreign policy.
What creates the room for some bold thinking about the next steps in the bilateral relationship is the fit between U.S. President Trump’s effort to recalibrate America's international relations and India’s ambitions to play a larger global role.
Whatever might be the civilian rhetoric, Pakistan’s army leadership is quite conscious that making the United States an enemy and putting all the eggs in the China basket is not a smart strategy.
While the outrage against outsourcing the Afghan war is real, the tragic reality is that the growing role of private armies is very much part of the modern hybrid wars.
India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
It is the nature of the negotiation between the United States and Pakistan—the most important external players in the Afghan conflict—that will determine the outcome.
The period known as the “Emergency” in India—June 1975 to March 1977—is widely recognized as one of the darkest episodes in the nation’s 70-year history.
Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “relaxed realism” on external issues stands in marked contrast to the liberals on the left and the nationalists on the right, who framed India’s international policies in extreme terms.
If China returned to genuine neutrality on the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan, it could make it a lot easier for New Delhi to set aside its sovereignty argument on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
With an assertive China and uncertainty of U.S. policy under the Trump administration, Europe and India have realized they have much to offer each other.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.
Any easing of tensions with Afghanistan and India will significantly boost Pakistan’s prospects for economic advancement at home and the elevation of its international standing.
Rather than debate India’s future with Pakistan's Prime Minister-designate Imran Khan in terms of “loves me, loves me not,” Delhi should focus on strengthening its position in Afghanistan, which once again is poised to shape Pakistan’s relations with India.