Anirudh Burman is a senior research analyst at Carnegie India. He works on key issues relating to public institutions, public administration, the administrative and regulatory state, and state capacity. He has also worked extensively on financial regulation and regulatory governance.
He has published works related to parliamentary oversight in India, the freedom of movement and residence, measuring the responsiveness of independent regulators in India, the design of insolvency professionals as a regulated profession, and the right to information.
Burman’s current research interests focus on property rights and land markets, particularly the regulatory framework affecting land rights and land titles, the relationship between tenure security and land transactions, and public administration issues in land markets in India. In addition, Burman also focuses on studying the working of the administrative state in India.
Prior to joining Carnegie India, Burman was a legal consultant with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in New Delhi where he worked on research related to land titling reforms in India, state capacity issues in land records maintenance, and financial and regulatory reform. Additionally, he assisted in the drafting of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act of 2016 (focus on regulatory governance, and regulation of market infrastructure), among other key responsibilities.
In the past, he has worked for the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, Amarchand Mangaldas in Mumbai, and PRS Legislative Research in New Delhi. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 2012 with a Masters in Law.
This chapter considers the debate over restrictions to free movement and residence that may be imposed to preserve law and order, as well as the balance between laws in public employment and education that discriminate against nonresidents, and curtail the rights of movement and residence.
This paper argues that the Indian Parliament’s oversight function needs to be strengthened in order to ensure the proper functioning of the executive. Accordingly, this paper proposes a detailed framework for the re-design of the Indian Parliament’s oversight mechanisms.
This paper seeks to measure the extent to which Indian regulators are responsive in the performance of their functions. It designs an index for the measurement of the responsiveness of regulators to stakeholders while framing regulations within their respective jurisdictions.
This paper explores the rationale behind creating a cadre of insolvency professionals who could help in the process of rescuing, restructuring, or liquidating a distressed firm. It was used by the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee to propose a design for the regulation of insolvency professionals.