This volatile history of India-Pakistan engagement over the last decade makes the agreement on opening the Kartarpur corridor quite significant.
As the United Kingdom seeks to bolster its trade with Australia, China, Japan, and India, the importance of sea lines of communications across the Indian ocean will grow and this will increase the strategic logic for the U.K. to have a naval presence in the region.
Unlike the European colonial powers, which could easily prevail over natives of the strategic island territories, today’s major powers have to deal with the more complex domestic politics of the island nations.
Ending India’s amnesia about the two World Wars must now be followed by a more purposeful engagement with Europe in reordering the security architecture of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.
China’s rising profile in the Andaman Sea is not limited to building strategic infrastructure like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kra Canal that allow Beijing reduce its current dependence on the Malacca Straits and access the Indian Ocean directly. Its military profile too is rising.
America’s renewed sanctions on Iran, which kicked in Monday this week, mark the beginning of a new crisis in the Middle East.
The India-Japan summit has laid out the foundations for a stronger operational strategic collaboration between the two countries.
The focus of a potential new arms race appears to be less on traditional nuclear armed missiles, but rather on precise hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads.
While New Delhi focuses narrowly on its own interests—energy security, welfare of migrant labor, and counter-terror cooperation—it tends to recoil from any political discussion of the existential challenges to the Arab Gulf.
As the Indian Ocean Region becomes enmeshed in the greater Indo-Pacific architecture, how is India adjusting the way it interacts with regional actors?