The Korean Peninsula is a large source of volatility in the geopolitical situation of East Asia.
As China is increasingly able to match its supportive statements with actual resources to reduce Nepal’s reliance on India, Kathmandu will naturally be tempted to play off New Delhi against Beijing.
The geopolitical legacies of Partition remain the biggest drag on India’s larger global aspirations. China has benefited from the division and its penetration of the subcontinent is becoming increasingly difficult to counteract.
Chinese military expenditure has gradually risen over the years along with its economy.
One of the unintended consequences for China from the Doklam crisis would be an India that is forced to think far more strategically about coping with China’s power.
As India settles into an extended military standoff with China in the Himalayas, it can’t afford to take its eyes off Beijing’s maritime forays in the Indian Ocean.
The uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration has created a space for India to take more of a lead in the region.
While several strategic factors and past investments will sustain the U.S.-India relationship in the short-term, the current path points in the direction of a plateau.
The idea of Bay of Bengal as a multilateral, strategic, and economic community has engendered multiple narratives around the bay.
The traditional props that have framed India-U.S. relationship over the last two decades—including those on shared democratic values and a common interest in Asian balance of power—can no longer provide an effective guidance to the Trump era.