If a revolutionary Iran exports ideology and destabilizes its neighbors, others have no option but to push back, balance, or contain.
As the Indian Ocean Region becomes enmeshed in the greater Indo-Pacific architecture, how is India adjusting the way it interacts with regional actors?
India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.
New Delhi and Seoul should focus on building flexible middle power coalitions in Asia to limit the impact of the current volatility in the relations between the United States and China.
While New Delhi has begun to build on the synergies with the United Arab Emirates on counter-terrorism and long-term strategic economic cooperation, it has barely scratched the surface of what is possible in the domain of defense.
India’s continuing political challenges with China’s Belt and Road Initiative have been matched by New Delhi’s enduring difficulties in advancing its own connectivity initiatives.
In the course of one morning in Singapore, U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have begun to loosen a deeply entrenched and hostile relationship.
With New Delhi must looking for stronger ties with both the maritime and continental powers does not mean the nature and scope of these possibilities is symmetric.
Securing the eastern Indian Ocean in partnership with Southeast Asian littorals like Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand could be one of the important near-term Indian contributions to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.