India will inevitably have to do more in Afghanistan, since the United States will not bear the security burden forever. Any substantive India-U.S. strategic coordination, however, could presage a major change in the regional politics of South Asia.
While New Delhi and Tokyo realize their limitations in competing with China-led initiatives, there is an unmatched intent and willingness in the Indo-Japanese relationship to collaborate on new areas across the region.
As old ideological divisions break down at the United Nations, New Delhi should take the lead in promoting practical solutions to international challenges, remembering that multilateralism is not an end in itself, but a means to pursue India’s national interests.
By condemning Pakistan-based terror groups, China has signaled that it is willing to hold Islamabad accountable for harboring terror in order to protect Chinese investments and security in the region.
Relations between India and Japan have transformed over the past few years, in part due the rapid rise of China and growing uncertainty over the future U.S. role in Asia.
New Delhi’s increased strategic engagement with Kabul is a break with past policies and will enhance India’s influence in the region.
India is increasingly seeking partnerships with like-minded countries with similar foreign policy goals, looking beyond the scope of South Asia to counter China’s looming influence in the region.
The growing international perception of India as a rising power is one of the factors fueling an increased interest in India’s foreign policy.
As China continues to ramp up its Indian Ocean presence, Delhi is stepping up its engagement, collaborations and demonstrations of leadership in the region.
The BRICS summit highlights the need for India’s foreign policy relations with China, Russia, and the United States to reflect pragmatism and realism rather than idealism.
While the Trump administration’s efforts to get tough on Pakistan face challenges and potential dangers, the change in stance signals a new political will to pursue previously untried measures which offer some hope of success.
The government’s flagship financial inclusion drive, the Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana, is one of the grandest policy initiatives of its kind by virtue of sheer scale.
As China is increasingly able to match its supportive statements with actual resources to reduce Nepal’s reliance on India, Kathmandu will naturally be tempted to play off New Delhi against Beijing.
Recognition of the right to privacy opens up a whole new world of legal possibilities, whether they be judicial directives to the state to enforce citizen privacy against technology giants, or even direct challenges against privacy policies of such companies.
The geopolitical legacies of Partition remain the biggest drag on India’s larger global aspirations. China has benefited from the division and its penetration of the subcontinent is becoming increasingly difficult to counteract.
Creating 12 million jobs a year is a challenge for any government and Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems well aware of it.
The tragedy of partition was compounded by the economic division of South Asia, an outcome that did not need to accompany the political separation. India’s efforts at regional economic integration will have implications for both peace and development.
The emerging concept of India as a “first responder” reflects the country’s growing capability and increasing willingness to assume the role of a leading power.
Regional connectivity projects give Afghanistan a substantive trading alternative to Pakistan and provide a powerful mechanism for trade and economic development.
One of the unintended consequences for China from the Doklam crisis would be an India that is forced to think far more strategically about coping with China’s power.