Instituting a Universal Basic Income requires public support spanning demographic lines, executive backing, and strong macroeconomic fundamentals.
India must recognize the reality of regional conflicts in the Middle East and limit their impact on India’s ability to secure its goals in the region.
India may not need a formal “Look West policy” to realize the new opportunities in the region if New Delhi views the Middle East on its own merits, pays sustained political attention, and delivers on the Indian economic and security commitments made at the highest levels.
Beyond just military power and humanitarian relief, India’s capacity to serve as a first responder to crises in the region also requires the strategic will and skill to help solve neighboring countries’ political conflicts.
The unfolding crisis in Maldives draws attention to the perennial question about whether and when India should intervene in the internal politics of its neighboring countries.
For New Delhi, the challenge is to patiently address the domestic concerns of its partners and develop frameworks for military cooperation that both are in fact, and are seen to be, mutually beneficial.
As India reaffirms the centrality of ASEAN for Asia’s peaceful future this week, New Delhi must back its words with concrete proposals for stronger defense and security cooperation with the region.
The challenge for India lies in finding the right balance between competing imperatives in the volatile Middle East amidst the pursuit of enlightened self-interest.
It is necessary to move past the idea of artificial intelligence being a replacement for humans across the board, and begin having a deeper conversation about its effectiveness as a tool in the hands of humans.
In the face of unexpected and significant pressure from the United States to deliver some top militants of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, the generals in Rawalpindi are locked in a serious debate.
New Delhi and Moscow must move toward a practical relationship that focuses on give and take wherever possible.
India’s problem is not about competing with China in South Asia, but managing its messy interdependence with the neighbours with some strategic vision and a lot of tactical finesse.
If past protests called for a reformation of the Islamic Republic established in 1979, some of the current slogans are calling for its overthrow. While few expect the protests to succeed, the legitimacy of the Islamic revolution is being challenged for the first time.
New Delhi needs to turn its attention in 2018 to creating significant domestic capabilities for information operations against threats at home and abroad.
Understanding the internal debate in the United States about its approach to the world is as important for India as parsing the administration’s latest thinking on China and Pakistan.
As the weakest of the major powers, New Delhi should stay engaged with both continental as well as maritime powers in order to improve its own place in the world order.
Without a return to genuine bilateralism that takes into account the interests of both parties, Beijing will find that the chasm with New Delhi continues to deepen.
If cultural, digital, and physical connectivity have become important themes in Indian diplomacy these days, so has the idea of minilateralism with multiple partners.
Leveraging Japanese expertise in robotic manufacturing and channelling local software talent would allow India to come to terms with a fast changing global economic scenario, where automation will rule the roost.
The Indian political and policy establishment, long brought up on the notion that Europe and Asia are different, must adapt to their slow but certain integration into a single geopolitical theatre.